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REVIEWS 
 
 
 
HARD YEARS FOR THE BALTICS1 
 
Кантор Ю. Прибалтика: война без правил (1939—1945). 
(Kantor Yu. The Baltics: a war without rules (1939—1945)) 
СПб.: Звезда, 2011. 336 с. 
 
Today, when the globalising world of the 21st century is undergoing 
rapid changes, historical issues remain an important factor affecting the 
development of international relations. Their effect can be positive: countries 
and people united by the ties of long-standing friendship treat each other 
with mutual respect and trust; it is easier for them to find the ways to solve 
arising problems. However, the past is tainted by wars and conflicts between 
countries and peoples; therefore, if they treated each other unfairly, it can 
create a negative background for the perception of each other in modern con-
ditions and lead to distrust and suspicion. It is especially pronounced in the 
cases when relations between states are still dominated by unresolved pro-
blems. Unfortunately, it is the case in relations between Russia and its neigh-
bours — the Baltics. In such a situation, of special importance are profound 
and well-grounded studies conducted by historians free of the influence of 
the current political struggle. One of such works is the book by the advisor to 
the director of the State Hermitage, Prof Yu. Z. Kantor. 
An important advantage of Yu. Kantor’s work is its strong primary 
source base. First of all, it is archive materials. The author uses documents 
from the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Russian 
State Naval Archive, Central Archive of the Federal Security Service, as 
well as Estonian State Archives, Latvian State Historical Archives, Lithua-
nian Special Archives, and the Archives of the Lithuanian Emigration Insti-
tute at the University of Kaunas. It is noteworthy that it is the first time some 
of these materials have been used for research purposes. 
Yu. Kantor found a number of new interesting materials in Russian 
archives. However, what is more important, she is a pioneer in studying the 
archives of the Baltic States. Thus, Yu. Kantor became one of the first scho-
lars having worked at the archives of the Lithuanian Emigration Institute of 
the University of Kaunas, whose documents are undoubtedly among the 
most interesting ones in the book. 
The book under review consists of three chapters, each has a short and 
succinct title: “From Baltia to the Baltics”, “Territory Ostland”, and “The 
Baltics again”. These names accurately mark out the hard road the peoples of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia went in the years of WWII. 
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The first chapter considers the course of events in Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia in pre-war years and the first period of WWII. At the time, the Baltic 
States were governed by the authoritarian regimes of A. Smetona, K. Ukma-
nis, and K. Päts. It was not a coincidence, but rather a logical development 
of the situation. In the 1920—30s, similar regimes were established in al-
most all countries that gained independence after WWI, except for Czechos-
lovakia and Finland. The reasons behind it were the virtual absence of urban 
middle classes, lack of experience of political elites, non-existent democratic 
traditions, aggravation of internal political struggle under the influence of the 
world economic crisis of the late 1920s-20s, and a number of other factors. 
Yu. Kantor is right to define the Baltic dictatorships as authoritarian 
ones. It is of importance, since a number of contemporary works still call 
them fascist regimes, not unlike the Comintern times. A distinctive trait of 
Baltic dictators was that, unlike many other authoritarian regimes, they had 
little room for manoeuvres in the field of international relations. Although 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were oriented towards the League of Nations 
and Western powers and strived to pursue a policy of neutrality following 
the Scandinavian example, in effect, they were forced to manoeuvre between 
the Soviet Union and Germany, both of which opposed the Versailles-Wa-
shington system. Cooperation between the three Baltic States was also redu-
ced to minimum. 
The author rightfully emphasises that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 
which became in effect the “second round” of the Munich Conspiracy of 
1938, shaped the destiny of the Baltic States for decades to come (p. 6). The 
work pays particular attention to the events that took place in Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia in the autumn of 1939 — spring of 1940, as well as the 
Soviet policy towards the Baltics. It is well known that, in Russian historio-
graphy, there are two perspectives on the changes that took place in the Bal-
tics in the summer of 1940. According to the first one, those changes, and 
the incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the USSR, happened 
at the will of the peoples and according to the then rules of international law. 
The adherents of the other perspective give an opposite assessment to these 
processes. Yu. Kantor takes the second position and puts forward serious ar-
guments in its favour. 
The second chapter devoted to the period of German occupation of the 
Baltics in 1941—1944 apparently proves the most important and interesting 
one, since it employs the largest number of archive materials studied by the 
author. Yu. Kantor describes in detail the policy of Hitlerite occupants, their 
arrogance towards the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians, who, if not 
subject to elimination like Jews, but were not considered equal either, 
undergoing mass repressions. The author does not neglect the issue of local 
collaborationists, their role in the course of Hitlerite policy, including their 
contribution to the reign of terror. Emphasising the cruelty of occupants,  
Yu. Kantor also admits that the anti-fascism resistance — despite the acco-
unts of Soviet historiography — was rather weak. Another important detail 
is that the book shows the particularities of the then situation in Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia. All in all, the analysis of the 1941—1944 period in  
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Yu. Kantor’s study has a number of advantages over similar publications, 
since it offers not superficial speculations, but rather a deep insight based on 
profound knowledge of the factual aspect. 
The third chapter is devoted to the period of 1944—1945, when, after 
German troops had been forced out, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia became a 
platform for the process which Yu. Kantor aptly calls “re-sovietisation” (p. 
243). It concerns the strengthening of the Union’s centralized power over the 
Baltic republics, which cherished hopes for greater independence, and the 
introduction of Soviet ways in all spheres of life, including those the Soviet 
authorities did not manage to “penetrate” in the autumn — spring of 1940—
1941, for example, mass collectivisation. This policy line was pursued with 
the severest and cruellest methods typical of Stalin’s time. Of course, it spar-
ked off resistance, which was stronger and more large-scale than that in 
1940—1941. It is only natural that, when considering these issues, Yu. Kan-
tor refers to the earlier events. 
The book under review also contains a number of contentious assump-
tions. 
Firstly, the question as to how, out of four countries that found themsel-
ves in the Soviet-controlled area, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia — unlike 
Finland — did not launch armed resistance either in 1939 or 1940, is poorly 
studied by Russian historiography. Of course, an important factor was a less 
favourable geographical position (Finland had neutral, but sympathising 
Sweden in the rear), lack of military and technological preparation (the Bal-
tics had nothing even remotely resembling the “Mannerheim line”), but the 
main reason was different. Yu. Kantor rightfully stresses that the authoritati-
ve policy of A. Smetona, K. Ulmanis, and K. Päts generated an “internal cri-
sis” (p. 20), which smothered resistance, but the main emphasis is placed on 
that the “ability to value independence and defend it” was not sufficiently 
developed in the Baltics (p. 20). One can agree that national identity was 
more pronounced in Finland than in the Baltic, although it is worth noting 
that a part of population and servicemen, especially in Estonia, were ready to 
fight. The policy of the Baltic dictators was shaped by the fear of their own 
peoples — hence, the aspiration to maintain power through different agree-
ments with the Soviet Union. The Baltic dictators deemed this way more re-
liable than an armed struggle with unpredictable results. 
Secondly, it seems that completely different points should be brought to 
the fore when analysing international reaction to changes in the Baltic. 
The sovietisation of West Belarus and Ukraine started right after the Red 
Army had entered their territories. Almost immediately after the Soviet 
offensive against Finland, the “people’s” government of O. Kuusinen was 
established for the same purpose, but Moscow did not take any steps towards 
the sovietisation. Yu. Kantor relates it to the unwillingness of the USSR to 
“sour relations with England and France and the uncertain prospects of the 
war in Europe” (p. 39). In my opinion, the main reason behind Moscow’s 
restraint was the position of Germany. As one of the leaders of NKVD,  
P. Sudoplatov, recalls, it was what V. M. Molotov talked about in October 
1939 at a meeting on the issues of Soviet policy in the Baltics. At the same 
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time, V. M. Molotov emphasised the need to create such a situation, when 
the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia would overthrow the bourgeois 
system on their own. After a break caused by the war with Finland, which 
lasted longer than it had been planned by the Soviet leadership, the Comin-
tern attempted to activate communist parties of the Baltics in the spring of 
1940, but to no avail. The German victories of May-June 1940 on the wes-
tern front frightened J. Stalin, who had to change the tactics again and resort 
to an open invasion in June 1940. 
The reaction of western powers to the events taking place in the Baltics 
in the summer of 1940 was not homogeneous. The UK, fighting a war 
against Hitler on its own, welcomed Soviet troops. Washington expressed its 
displeasure, but much more mildly than in case of the offensive against 
Finland. Trying not to sour relations with the Soviet Union, western powers 
were (as certain signs indicated) ready to deal with the “people’s” 
governments of the Baltics, which were formed under the Soviet direction. 
However, they categorically refused to acknowledge the sovietisation of the 
Baltics. Of certain interests is the behaviour of foreign diplomats, who 
visited the first sitting of the Estonian Parliament, which had been elected 
and functioned according to the Soviet model, on July 21, 1940. They liste-
ned to the Internationale, which was performed instead of the anthem of — 
technically — still independent Estonia; they were present at the establish-
ment of parliament committees, but left the session in protest when the 
issues of declaring Estonia a Soviet Socialist Republic and its incorporation 
into the USSR were put on the agenda. 
In my opinion, Yu. Kantor’s statement that during WWII and after it, 
“the West acknowledged the right of the Soviet Union to the Baltics de fac-
to, by default” (p. 243) seems questionable. I believe that the situation was 
less unambiguous. Of course, in the course of WWII, the Baltic issue was 
not a priority, but it was not totally neglected either. So, in May 1942, 
London refused to include the clause on acknowledging the USSR within the 
1941 borders into the Soviet-British Alliance Treaty, which meant, in 
particular, de jure recognition of the incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia into the USSR; J. Stalin was forced to concede. In December 1943, 
during the Tehran Conference, F. D. Roosevelt had a conversation with J. 
Stalin about the possibility of holding free elections and a referendum in Li-
thuania, Latvia, and Estonia, although the conversation was of most general 
nature. 
After WWII, the attitude hardly changed. The doctrines of “containment 
of communism” and “rollback of communism”, which were the priority lines 
of Western policy at the early stages of the Cold War, suggested that the 
USSR return to the borders of 1939, i. e. those excluding Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia. In the 1960s-70s, western states started to exhibit certain 
differences. For instance, Great Britain and some other Western European 
states agreed to settle property disputes that resulted from the sovietisation of 
the Baltics in 1940, which can be considered their de facto acknowledge-
ment. The USA, Canada and a number of other western countries did not 
take that step. The cases of de jure recognition of the incorporation of Li-
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thuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the USSR were of isolated nature (the 
Netherlands, France). Prior to the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (Helsinki, 1975), the President of the United States, G. Ford, 
emphasised that the signing of the Final Act does not mean recognition of 
the incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the USSR. 
Thirdly, Yu. Kantor writes that, in 1946, the Baltic republics ceased to 
be the “zone of turmoil” and “turned into something of an affluent, by Soviet 
measurement, “showcase of socialism” (p. 286). 
I believe that it happened later — after the death of J. Stalin and the XX Con-
gress of the CPSU. Resistance to Soviet practices was insignificant from the 
start. Even profound studies of the Soviet period acknowledged that, even 
before the German offensive against the USSR, the Baltics were a site of a 
“small-scale civil war”. The struggle against re-sovietisation was waged on a 
larger scale. The guerrilla and underground movements could not be sup-
pressed solely by repressions. It made the CPSU leadership change their po-
licy line in the mid-1950s: Baltic nationals were granted access to the par-
ty/governmental, economic, and intellectual elite, the standards of living ex-
ceeded the Soviet average, and certain “liberties” were allowed in the field 
of culture. It soothed general population and became a prerequisite for the 
development of the image of the Baltics as the “Soviet West”. In my opi-
nion, J. Stalin learnt his lessons from the sovietisation of the Baltics in 1940 
and the post-war sovietisation of the countries of Central and Eastern Euro-
pe. In the latter, communist practices were introduced in a milder form — 
that of people’s democracy, — which was rather similar to what certain left-
winged circles of the Baltics requested from the Soviet leadership in summer 
1940. 
Naturally, these issues do not downplay the general impression from Yu. 
Kantor’s book and rather makes one think of new lines of research on this 
important and very complex topic. 
 
K. Khudolei 
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